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The current global trend to decentralize governance control within education systems has 
developed theories on how this will influence education inequalities. Discourse regarding the 
global trend to decentralize governances in a nation has claimed the shift to be a product of 
neoliberalism and thus argue that decentralization exacerbates social inequalities (Burbules and 
Torres, 2000; Morrow and Torres, 2000; Apple, 2000; Hill and Kumar, 2009; Hill, Greaves, and 
Maisuria, 2009). However, such claims have founded their reasoning on the nature of neoliberal 
and conservative political interests, which is assumed to foster social inequality, and because of 
this, it is not an argument about how the innate characteristics of education decentralization in 
education systems produce inequality.  
In fact, empirical research on the relationship between education decentralization and 
social inequality has produced ambiguous results (Micklewright, 2000; Braun and Gote, 2000; 
Prawda, 1993; Raudenbush, Fotiu etal, 1998; Ka-Ho, 2004). This body of research includes case 
studies that examine processes of governance framework changes toward decentralization in 
national education systems and its consequences.  In general, this research has shown that 
education decentralization has increased, decreased, or shown little change to education 
inequalities (Parry, 1997; Ka-Ho, 2004; Bray, 1996; Zhang, 2006; Gradstein etal, 2005; Checchi 
etal, 1999; Lipman, 2004). If decentralization inherently functioned to increase social inequality, 
all cases where decentralization occurred would experience an increase in social inequalities. But 
that has not occurred, so arguments that claim decentralization produces social inequality do not 
seem valid.   
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In this study, I examine the association between education decentralization and social 
inequality by using data on national education system governance and education inequality in 26 
nations. The goal of the study is to examine the hypothesized link between education 
decentralization and education inequality. I do this by looking at the association in multiple 
countries pursuing many different approaches to education decentralization.  
The structure of my paper is as follows. First, I review theories of education inequality, 
paying particular attention to arguments about the association between education decentralization 
and inequality, and to the logical underpinning of these arguments. Then, I introduce the data for 
my study, discussing the measurements and methods I used to measure different forms of 
education decentralization, and I assess the relationship between these forms of decentralization 
and education inequality. Finally, I present the main findings of my research and discuss the 
implications of these findings for theory and research on the effects of education decentralization 




Social Mobility and Education Inequality 
 
The relationship between education and social inequality is well established. The 
education system has often been referred to as a “sorting machine” for society because 
individuals that leave the system enter into careers with others who have similar educational 
attainment histories (Spring, 1976). Through this lens, stratification in a society can occur 
naturally as individual interests lead to occupational choices. However, research has suggested 
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that institutions, such as education systems, are structured in such a way to set constraints on 
these choices by channeling educational opportunities (Kerckhoff, 1995; Kerckhoff, 2001; Horn, 
2009; Buchmann and Park, 2005). Under these conditions, individual access to educational 
opportunities gives access to certain occupations and restricts access to others. The Blau and 
Duncan’s (1967) basic model of status attainment first captured these stratification processes, by 
observing that the social status of a child’s family partially determined that child’s educational 
attainment and educational attainment then affected the occupational attainment of the child at 
adulthood. The Blau-Duncan model thus showed that education has the ability to enhance or 
hinder a child’s occupational mobility in society.  
Education research has further developed this argument. One important finding was that a 
positive association between family origin and educational attainment exists cross-nationally 
(Shavit & Blossfeld, 1993). Multiple explanations have since been presented on this 
phenomenon. For example, the general association between educational attainment and 
occupational mobility was argued to result from the spread of industrialization, although in this 
argument, societies that were more industrialized were seen to have weaker connections between 
origin and educational attainment than traditional societies (Treiman and Yip, 1989). Later, 
however, noted variations in the link between educational attainment and social mobility across 
industrialized nations. Particularly important for this paper is the work of Müller and Karle 
(1993), which examined how educational standardization condition this relationship. 
As an institutional mechanism, educational standardization has been argued to influence 
levels of social reproduction. Standardization refers to the level of homogeneity among schools 
in an education system, and the opposite of standardization would be complete school autonomy 
(Van de Werfhort and Mijs, 2010). Standardization can occur along a number of dimensions of 
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schooling, including allocation of school resources, uniformity of teacher training and practice, 
and uniformity of achievement standards and testing processes. All education systems are 
standardized to some extent, especially since most operate according to a “world model” of 
schooling that is built around standard grade levels, curricula, and so on (Schofer and Meyer, 
2005). However, how this standard model of schooling is implemented—through exit exams, 
curriculum content, teacher certification or school budgets—and at what level of national 
governance such standards are organized and controlled—varies considerably, with some nations 
imposing more standardization on education than others. Moreover, although standardization 
apparently influences education inequality, the degree of this is unclear. In particular, 
educational research has shown that standardization weakens the association between status 
origin and educational attainment by giving individuals from different social backgrounds more 
equal access to education expenditures, teaching practices, curricular opportunities and so on 
(Horn, 2009; Muller & Shiller, 2000; Schütz et al, 2008; Wössmann, 2003).  
 
Decentralization in Educational Research 
 
 Research on standardization has encouraged current views on decentralization in 
education systems. Decentralization is understood to be the shift of responsibility for planning, 
management, and the raising and allocation of resources from the central government to lower 
levels of government or even non-governmental organizations (Rondinelli and Nellis, 1986). In 
other words, decentralization represents devolution within an education system in the 
authoritative bodies responsible for education policy and implementation. The effects of 
standardization in education systems has been relevant to disputes regarding decentralized 
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governance because decentralization has the ability to grant more autonomy to local units, and 
this autonomy, in turn, could produce less standardization in educational opportunities across 
localities, and potentially create an increase in educational inequality (as expressed through local 
differences in access to education resources, high quality teachers and teaching, advanced 
curricular opportunities, and so on). 
 Before educational research began to focus directly on the effects of governance 
frameworks, connections between standardization and decentralization paved the way to more 
current opinions. Although these studies do not directly address governance frameworks—and 
may only mention decentralization or centralization briefly—there is something to be learned 
from them because they are among the first to begin to make claims about how governance 
frameworks influence education systems. Many of these studies have focused on the effects 
standardization has had on education inequality:  
 
“Thus it is obvious that the educational administration in the United States 
is decentralized, and that the educational provisions are unstandardized. 
Certain segments of the population are disadvantaged because [of] local 
components [in] the educational system…” (Allmendinger, 1989: 47) 
 
“When national systems of curricula and examinations are aligned, 
centrally directed reforms can be a mechanism both for raising standards, 
and for reducing inequality.” (Gamoran, 1996: 17) 
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Allmendinger argues that unstandardized educational provisions create structural barriers for 
students by denying opportunities in certain schools rather than others. Allmendinger’s study 
addresses how standardization can reduce this inequality by providing the same opportunities to 
students through standardizing educational provisions. However, incidentally, while making this 
argument, he also includes his opinion about governance frameworks (when decentralization is 
mentioned) in this argument; Allmendinger claims that unstandardization, as well as 
decentralization, create unequal opportunities in an education system. Gamoran argues that 
centralization in education systems can reduce unequal curriculum standards in schools. And 
although, governance frameworks are more centrally considered in Gamoran’s study compared 
to Allemdinger’s, the supporting argument still concentrates on standardization and its influence 
on education inequality. Gamoran argues that standardization can reduce unequal education 
opportunity by reducing variation in curriculum and, because centralization is similar to 
standardization, centralization will do the same.  
Kerckhoff (1995) also considers the effect governance frameworks have on education 
inequality, and comes to similar conclusions as Allmendinger and Gamoran. Kerckhoff argues 
that a difference in access to educational resources within and across schools is an element of 
educational inequality. He uses the United States education system as an example, and further 
argues that differences in access to educational resources in American schools create education 
inequality, which is partially due to local control and governance. Kerkchoff cites Stevenson and 
Baker (1991) to support this connection between access to educational resources and local 
control (Kerckhoff, 1995: 330); the study focused on the relationship between governance levels 
with control over curriculum—national or local—and curriculum instruction in mathematics 
classrooms. The study argues that education systems that give local governments control over 
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curricular issues create more variation in classroom content instruction. In other words, more 
centralized curricular development can standardize content instruction in classrooms. Kerkchoff 
views decentralization as it relates to a lack of standardization, by citing Stevenson and Baker 
(1991), and uses the United States as a case study to make the connection between 
decentralization, unstandardization and education inequality.  
These viewpoints consider how governance frameworks influence mechanisms of 
education inequality when it relates to standardization. Discourses on the effect governance 
frameworks have on education inequality have remained within the sphere of standardization 
research in education literature. Other literatures have reached similar opinions as Kerckhoff, 
Gamoran and Allmendinger, by making connections between governance frameworks and 
education inequality based on case studies and standardization research (Van de Werfhorst & 
Mijs, 2010: 420; Horn, 2009: 347-8). However, to further understand how governance 
frameworks directly influence mechanisms of education inequality, research should include 
larger samples and governance frameworks should be observed in education systems that are 
standardization and unstandardized.  
Case studies and standardization research have outlined possible mechanisms that effect 
education inequality and from these understandings, opinions about governance frameworks 
have developed. Many believe that a lack of standardization can be viewed as decentralization 
and because a lack of standardization is associated with various measures of education 
inequality, decentralization is associated with these same measures of education inequality. 
However, this viewpoint is a bit too easy because governance control is not a distinct indication 
of whether or not an education system is standardized or unstandardized. This explanation only 
captures a portion of governance frameworks. Centralization does not necessarily lead to 
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standardization and decentralization does not necessarily lead to lack of standardization 
(Kerkchoff, 2000). An education system is capable of being unstandardized under a centralized 
governance framework, or standardized in a decentralized governance framework. For example, 
Iceland, Slovakia and Sweden, countries that have centralized the process of designing 
curriculum programmes, have allowed regions and schools to choose which curriculum 
programme they will implement in their schools. Although these countries have a centralized 
curriculum design in their education system, curriculum is not fully standardized because schools 
have the ability to choose different curriculum programmes and implement them into their own 
classrooms. Additionally, an education system is capable of being standardized under a 
decentralized governance framework. For example, the German education system is 
decentralized, with power given primarily to regional level governments, called Länders. 
However, regional governments often converse with one another and agree to develop and 
implement educational standards and policies together (World Education Encyclopedia, 2002). 
This system of collaboration creates a level of standardization within a decentralized governance 
framework.  
Because of the education systems above, and others with similar structures, a lack of 
standardization cannot be viewed as a synonym for decentralization in educational research. 
Clear distinctions need to be made between a lack of standardization and decentralization, and 
standardization and centralization, to more closely study how different governance frameworks 
influence education systems. Governance frameworks are complex. They function beyond the 




Closer Looks at Decentralization 
 
Some studies have looked at the impact of decentralization more closely than the 
literature previously mentioned. Literature that focuses on governmental regime changes in 
education systems has relied on case studies to develop opinions on decentralization and 
education inequality. Latin American countries, which have lately begun to decentralize their 
education systems, have been researched to understand how decentralization impacts national 
levels of education inequality. From these case studies conflicting results have been found 
regarding the effects decentralization has on education inequality in a particular nation; when 
Mexico decentralized allocation processes in their education system, geographical disparities in 
achievement scores substantially reduced; however, geographical disparities in achievement test 
scores grew in Chile—students from privately paid schools (located in high income 
neighborhoods) scored higher than students from rural municipal schools (Prawda, 1993). Other 
case studies have concluded that the impact of governance frameworks depends on how and 
where it is implemented in an education system. Some argue that decentralizing fiscal processes 
can exacerbate differences in access to educational resources, and other conditions of educational 
inequality; however, decentralization in other educational domains, such as political power, 
could yield positive effects (Prawda, 1993; Bray, 1996; Zhang, 2006; Gradstein, 2005; Braun 
and Gote, 2000). These case studies have set the foundation for how governance frameworks 
should be observed in the future.  
Governance frameworks are complex and different forms can reside in an education 
system. All types of governance frameworks should be considered in all areas of an education 
system. When evaluating how governance frameworks impact education inequality, governance 
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framework categories cannot be too broad. However, these studies have developed arguments 
about governance frameworks from case studies, which don not provide a high degree of 
generalizability. A larger sample should to be used to study the potential impact governance 
frameworks have on education inequality so that more general arguments can be made on 
governance frameworks.  
This study strives to bring this perspective to the current debate on decentralization in 
education systems by doing the following: I first measure education inequality as the association 
between social origin and educational attainment (a variable I call “educational attainment 
reproduction” in what follows). I then examine the relationship between governance frameworks 
and national levels of education attainment reproduction in a series of statistical analyses. 
Importantly, in these analyses, I argue that education decentralization should be observed in 
multiple education system domains, such as budget, curriculum, jurisdiction and policy. This 




As discussed, a common assumption about how governance frameworks affect various 
types of education inequality has been made.  Educational researchers believe that 
decentralization in education systems exacerbates education inequality and that centralization 
diminishes education inequalities. This assumption, however, has not been supported uniformly 
by education research. As my literature review showed, there was evidence from some studies 
that standardization of education practices reduces various aspects of education inequality, but as 
discussed in my review, standardization is not a direct measure of governmental decentralization 
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in education. By contrasts, case studies of educational decentralization show ambiguous findings 
about the relationship of educational decentralization and educational inequality, with systems 
undergoing educational decentralization experiencing increases, decreases, and no change in 
education inequality. Overall, as I discussed in my literature review, a major problem in the 
literature has been the implicit assumption that centralization in governance frameworks leads to 
standardization of educational opportunities and that decentralization involves a lack of 
standardization. However, this is just an assumption, and as I showed in my literature review, 
some decentralized education systems are characterized by standardization, so the implicit 
assumption that centralization equates to standardization and decentralization equates to a lack of 
standardization might not be true.   
Because of this shortcoming in previous research, I believe another viewpoint is worth 
examining. This viewpoint is grounded in the idea that governance frameworks (e.g. 
centralization and decentralization) can vary across education system domains, defined as areas 
of government decision making such as budget, curriculum, and other areas of policy. This paper 
examines the relationship between these dimensions of education governance and education 
inequality using a large sample of nations that will include national education systems that vary 
in the extent to which different education system domains are centralized or decentralized. The 
benefit of this approach is that, in this large sample of nations, education 
centralization/decentralization, does not overlap perfectly with the amount of standardization in 
these education systems. By disentangling these two constructs, I am in a position to examine the 
following research questions: 
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1) Do the most decentralized education systems have the highest levels of educational 
inequality?  
2) Do the most centralized education systems have the lowest levels educational inequality?  
3) Can governance frameworks influence levels of educational inequality?  
 
My expectation (based on the case study literature) is that an association between governance 
frameworks and education inequality will not be present in any education system domain; put 
differently, decentralization in education systems does not directly exacerbate education 
inequality and centralization does not directly diminish education inequality. 
 
Data and Variables 
 
This paper uses a sample of 26 nations and engages in comparative research for several 
reasons.  First, single case studies that have examined the impact of governance frameworks on 
education inequality lack generality. Additionally, these case studies often defined governance 
framework types in different ways, which limits the ability to compare study results across 
nations. To increase comparability, this study defines   governance framework types uniformly 
across nations, examines these frameworks in multiple education system domains in each nation 
studied, and examines a uniform indicator of education inequality in each nation. The analysis is 
thus fully comparative.  Education decentralization is measured in the same way across all 
national education systems in the sample, and educational inequality is also measured uniformly 
across all nations.  This section describes these measures, and the sample of countries included in 
the study. 
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In the paper, educational inequality (the dependent variable) is measured as the empirical 
association between a child’s social origin (O) and that child’s adult educational attainment (E), 
a measure of educational inequality originates from the Blau-Duncan basic model on social 
mobility1. By observing how closely family background is related to educational attainment, this 
study measures the level of educational attainment reproduction in a given education system.  In 
the following pages, I refer to this measure as education attainment reproduction.  This measure 
is explained in more detail below. 
The independent variable(s) in this study is education decentralization.  As discussed, I 
measure decentralization in various education system domains, including: producing education 
funds, purchasing education resources, designing curriculum programmes, selecting curriculum 
programmes, education jurisdiction and education policy governance frameworks.. These 
measures are described more fully below. 
The primary approach to data analysis involves examining the bivariate relationship among the 
dependent variable and each of the independent variables in order to arrive at a better 
understanding of the effect governance frameworks have on education inequality, where 




This study contains a sample of 26 countries. These countries were selected from the 
2009 ISSP Social Inequalities Module country survey. Since the main dependent variable of this 
                                                        
1 My definition of education inequality as education attainment reproduction differs from other definitions used in 
the research. For example, as my literature review showed, several studies define education inequality in terms of 
intermediate variables that can be assumed to affect ultimate educational attainment, variables such as structural 
barriers to curricular opportunities, inequalities in education funding that deny individuals resources, or varying 
standards. 
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study requires information about the association between parent’s occupation and their children’s 
highest attained degree, any country or respondent that did not include father’s occupation or 
children’s education is not included in the sample. The resulting sample of countries, and the size 
of the respondent sample in each country, is displayed in Appendix Table 1.1a. Generalized 
results can be assumed in this study because of the level of diversity in the country sample. The 
country sample includes 13 developed countries, 13 underdeveloped countries and 6 countries 
with socialist histories. 4 out of 6 continents are represented in the sample—South America, 
Europe, Asia, Africa and North America—however, 20 out of 26 countries reside in Europe. 
Results may be generalized across developmental levels and historical connections to socialist 
ideologies. However, continents are not accurately represented in the country sample—European 
countries are overly represented; Countries in South America, Asia, Africa and North America 
are underrepresented; and Oceanic countries are not included. This could create complications 
for generalizing results, but including countries in multiple continents (even if these continents 
are not accurately represented) is sufficient for generalization purposes for this study. 
Additionally each country is referenced by its abbreviated name and information on this can be 
found in Appendix Table 1.1b.  
 
The Independent Variables: Measures of Governance frameworks in Education Systems 
 
To create the independent variables, I collected data from a variety of sources, including 
data published by the Organisation for Economic and Co-operative Development (OECD), data 
published in encyclopedias, and data coded from my reading of National constitutions, 
government websites and national reports.  
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Curriculum Decentralization Indicators. OECD’s Education at a Glance reports 
contain extensive information on national education systems. OECD’s Education at a Glance 
published data on national education system curriculum processes based on government level 
responsibilities. Collected in 2007, the data describe which level of government handles different 
types of decisions about curriculum in public lower secondary education; the educational level, 
public lower secondary education is based on the revised International Standard Classification of 
Education (ISCED-97). All OECD curriculum indicators take into consideration all types of 
educational needs, including special education programmes. The OECD curriculum indicators, 
“Design Curriculum Programs” and “Select Curriculum Programs” and are the domains of 
governance examined in this study. In each domain, I coded the level of government decision-
making using the following typology: School, School/Local, Local, Local/Region, Region, 
Region/National, National, School/Region, School/National, and Local/National.2For example, 
the following OECD codes: “School Framework at Region level”, “School Consultation with 
Region level”, and “School Autonomous”, would be converted into the following categories: 
“School/Region”, “School/Region”, and “School”.  
 
Budget Decentralization Indicators. The OECD Education at a Glance 2010 
publication provided data on national education system budgets based on government level 
responsibilities for primary, secondary and post-secondary, non-tertiary education. Data were 
collected in 2007 and describe which government level is the initial source of public educational 
                                                        
2 Note that my coding framework translates some OECD codes. For example, I translated the OECD codes “School 
Framework at Region level” to “School/Region” to reflect shared governance at these system levels; I translated the 
OECD code, “School Consultation with Regional level” to “School/Region” as well; and finally, I translated the 
OECD code “School Autonomous” to “School” in my coding scheme. 
  17 
funds and which government level is the final purchaser of educational resources for national 
education systems. The data describe government level responsibilities in percentages across 
three government level categories: Central, Region and Local. The OECD budget indicators are 
labeled here as “Produce Education Funds” and “Purchase Education Resources”. The original 
OECD data were converted into the same government level typology previously described. To 
do this, the government level with the highest percentage of responsibility was labeled as the 
government level responsible for a budget function. Any country with two government level 
responsibility percentages that differed by less than 30% were labeled as having a shared 
responsibility. For example, 81.4 percent of initial funds were under the responsibility of the 
“Central” government in Slovakia. This study presents the Slovakian governance framework for 
Producing Education Funds as “National” in responsibility. However, in Finland, the “Central” 
government provides 42.5 percent of initial funds and “Local” government provides the 
remaining 57.5 percent of initial funds. In this study, the Finland governance framework for 
Producing Education Funds is labeled as “National/Local” responsibility. Budget data on 
Sweden and China, and curriculum data on Slovakia, Switzerland, Poland, Israel, Ireland, 
Canada, and United States, were all collected from national education system reports and official 
government websites due to missing data in OECD’s datasets. Information was only added if the 
named resources provided information that clearly stated the following: “curriculum is designed 
by”, “curriculum is selected by”, “budget is provided by”, or “resources are purchased by”. Any 
other explanations were not accepted to avoid risks of large irregularities between OECD data 
and data from additional resources. 
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Education Jurisdiction Decentralization Indicator. Data for the  Education 
Jurisdiction indicator were collected from the World Constitutions Illustrated (HeinOnline) and 
from official government webpages. Legal documents such as the constitution or education 
related constitutional amendments were used to determine jurisdictional authority. Each 
country’s national constitution and official government website was reviewed for explicit 
references to jurisdictional authority over the national education system as it pertains to primary, 
secondary and post-secondary, non-tertiary education. This indicator does not consider which 
level of government is actually involved in educational matters but rather which government 
level is given legal responsibility to maintain education. For example, in the United States, 
although national government does contribute to education, legal jurisdictional authority resides 
in state governance based on the Tenth Amendment in the United States Constitution. Therefore, 
in this study, the United States is labeled to have a “Regional” level governance framework for 
Education Jurisdiction. 
 
Education Policy Indicator. Data for the Education Policy indicator was collected from 
the World Education Encyclopedia (2002) and the International Encyclopedia of National 
Education Systems (1995). Country profiles were reviewed for explicit references to education 
policy as it pertained to primary, secondary, and post-secondary, non-tertiary education. 
Moreover, when considering the level of government responsible for education policy, 
references to a government level with power, authority, or influence on education policy was 
taken into account. When multiple government levels were mentioned, without one being 
mentioned as the “primary” authoritative body, and especially when the term “both” was used, 
then a shared authority was assumed. For example, in Spain, both provinces and the Ministry of 
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education, a national government body, have policy-making power and influence on education 
reform. Therefore, in this study, Spain is labeled as a “Regional/National” governance 
framework for Education Policy. 
 
The Dependent Variable:  Education Attainment Reproduction 
 
The measure of education attainment reproduction used in this study comes from the 
2009 ISSP Social Inequalities Module country survey. The analyses presented here report the 
association between parental status, which is based on the parent’s occupation, and their 
children’s highest attained degree. Although the original survey requested the occupational status 
of both parents, most nations only gathered information on the father’s occupation. Because of 
this, only the occupational status of the father is used to represent family origin in this study. The 
survey gathered information on all adult citizens of the country, ages 18 or older. To capture the 
highest attained degree of children I selected survey respondents between the ages of 25-643.  
Importantly, any country or respondent that did not include father’s occupation or 
children’s education is not included in the sample. The resulting sample size in each country is 
displayed in Appendix Table 1.1.  
In this study, the highest degree attained by children (shown in Appendix Table 1.2) is 
represented by five educational levels: Primary, Incomplete Secondary, Secondary, Some 
Tertiary, and University. The father’s occupational status (shown in Appendix Table 1.3) is 
                                                        
3 The age of my respondents is a problematic feature of the analysis as it will create an historical disjunction 
between the independent variables in the analysis and the dependent variable in the following sense: In the current 
sample, older individuals will have passed through education systems many years prior to the dates when I measured 
education system features. However, because governmental regimes are hard to change, I will maintain the 
assumption that the measurements for governance frameworks are not far from the frameworks that my respondents 
experienced while going through the education system. I recognize this is a problem in my research, however, I will 
discuss what routes I would have taken, if time allotted this, during the discussion section of my paper and further 
conclude what value my research has despite this issue. 
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described in seven occupational classes: I. Upper-grade professionals/managers, II. Lower-grade 
professionals/managers, III. Clerical Worker, IVab. Self-Employed, VI. Skilled Manual, VIIab. 
Unskilled Manual, Ivc. Farmers. The seven occupational class categories were developed from 
the Goldthorpe Class Schema, also referred to as the Comparative Analysis of Social Mobility in 
Industrial Nations (CASMIN). This social class scheme is commonly used in class and social 
mobility research throughout Europe, North America and Australia.  
 
Measure of National Education Attainment Reproduction.  In this study, the higher 
the coefficient for educational attainment reproduction, the greater the social inequality in a 
country. To measure the extent to which nations were characterized by educational attainment 
reproduction, I used the following analytic procedure.  The basic data output on which this 
measure is based is the relationship between father’s social class (social origin) and children’s 
highest educational degree (educational attainment). I will begin by describing the raw 
association between social origin and educational attainment in cross-tabulations of these two 
characteristics, across all countries and within each country. In a second step, I apply log-linear 
models to estimate the overall association between social origin and educational attainment for 
each country, independent of cross-country differences, in the distribution of social origins (class 
structure) and the distribution of educational degrees. The raw association between social origin 
and educational attainment across all countries and these two characteristics function as 
examples of varying levels of associations. With these examples, I am able to develop an 
estimated total association of origin and educational attainment to better understand and compare 
levels of educational attainment reproduction across all countries.  
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This dependent variable is constructed from a Log-Linear model called the “UniDiff” 
model. The “UniDiff” model has been developed by Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992) and Xie 
(1992), and implies that the pattern of association between O and E is constant across countries 
while the level of association differs across countries. For instance, children that are raised in an 
upper-grade professional (I.) household may be more likely to attain higher levels of education 
than children that are raised in an unskilled manual (VIIab.) household in all countries; however, 
the strength of this association may be different across countries. The UniDiff model has been 
used in numerous research studies that have observed intergenerational mobility and educational 
attainment reproduction in nations. The attractive feature of this model is that it produces a single 
parameter that describes the overall association between origin and education for each country. 
That is, it produces an educational attainment reproduction coefficient for each country that will 
serve as the dependent variable in the macro-level analyses 
 
Approach to Data Analysis  
 
The basic plan is to examine the empirical relationship between education 
decentralization variables and the dependent variable measuring educational attainment 
reproduction.  In the first stage of the analysis, I conduct a series of bivariate Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) regressions in which each education system indicator is regressed on the 
dependent variable.   These regressions are conducted separately for each education system 
domain. In order to meet the assumptions of regression analysis, the OLS regression models only 
include a portion of the governance framework types.  That is, in the regression models I only 
include nations that have the following governance frameworks in a domain: school, 
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school/local, local, local/Region, Region, Region/national, and national. I make this data 
restriction to maintain a reasonable assumption that the governance framework typology is an 
ordinal scale from the most decentralized to the least decentralized (i.e. centralization). In the 
results section below, I report these analyses both graphically and numerically.  That is, for each 
independent variable, I show the scatterplot of the governance framework variables by 
educational attainment reproduction.  In this scatterplot, I also show the OLS regression line 
relating these variables, as well as the unstandardized regression coefficient.  Finally, in a 
separate section of the scatterplot, I also show values for excluded nations (i.e., nations with 
governance frameworks classified as school/Region, school/national and local/national. On the 
scatterplot, a red line intersecting the x-axis at the school/Region governance framework type 
represents this exclusion.  
As the reader will see, the regression analyses suffer from heteroskedasticity in errors.  
As a result, in a second stage of the analysis, I conduct a series of difference in means T-tests.  
This statistical model assumes that countries with different levels of decentralization in a system 
are independent samples that have unequal variances. Using this approach, I then assess whether 
distinct differences exist between mean values of education attainment reproduction among 
governance framework types, examining this separately for education system domains. For these 
t-tests, the original governance framework typology, which included 10 categories, was 
condensed into three categories: Lower, Shared and National. These groups are defined as: (a) 
national education systems that include only governments below national government (coded 
here as Lower); (b) national education systems that include both national government and lower 
levels of government (coded as Shared); and (c) national education systems that only include 




I begin by reporting on the levels of educational attainment inequality in various countries in the 
sample.  To arrive at a measure of this variable in each country, I used a statistical log-linear 
model to estimate the overall association between Origin (O) and Education (E) . Among the 
various statistical models that could be used to estimate the total association between Origin (O) 
and Education (E), I used the so-called “UniDiff” model—highlighted in bold.  Table 1 shows 





Table 1 shows various model fit statistics for three different approaches to estimating educational 
attainment reproduction:  the “no association” model, the “common association” model, and the 
“uniform difference” (or UniDiff) model.  As Table 1 shows, the UniDiff model is superior to 
these other models by a number of criteria.  For example, judging model fit by the BIC criterion, 
one can see that the Uniform Difference model is clearly preferable over the Common 
Association model as seen by the fact that the Likelihood ratio (G2) for Uniform Difference is 
lower than the Likelihood ratio of Common Association. Moreover, although the Common 
Association model is highly significant, it fails to lower the number of misclassified cases (∆) as 
greatly as the UniDiff model. The preferred model, UniDiff, yields a satisfactory fit because it 
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misclassifies on average 6.66 percent of the cases (∆), and it is highly significant. The UniDiff 
model can therefore be viewed as an accurate description of education attainment reproduction 
trends across all countries. By using the UniDiff model, a single coefficient for educational 





Table 2 shows the values for education attainment reproduction rates for each country in the 
sample as estimated by the UniDiff model.  The values in the table are expressed as the 
difference between a given country’s actual level of education attainment inequality and the 
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sample mean.  Thus, countries that have higher values in the table have more educational 
inequality than average, and countries with negative values have less educational inequality than 
average (where the sample average is .822).  Clearly, the data in Table 2 show that countries vary 
widely in education attainment inequality.  The most unequal country (i.e., the country with the 
most reproduction) is Hungary; the least unequal is Iceland. 
 
OLS Regression Analysis 
 
Having measured the level of education attainment reproduction in each country, I now 
turn to examining the relationship between this variable and my measures of education 
decentralization using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression analysis.  The analysis consists 
of presenting a series of scatterplots on which education attainment inequality is plotted on the Y 
axis, and a measure of education system decentralization is plotted in X axis.  In each scatterplot, 
I also show the linear regression line relating these variables as estimated from the OLS 
regression of education attainment inequality on the independent variable (where the 
unstandardized regression coefficient for the slope of this line is shown at the top right of the 
graph).  In general, if education decentralization increases education inequality, we should 
expect the regression lines to be negative in slope—that is, to decrease as we move from the left 
of the graph (where the countries that are decentralized in a domain are plotted) to the right of 
the graph (where the countries that are more centralized in a domain are plotted).  Note that in 
these OLS analyses, certain countries are omitted (although their data is shown in the extreme 
right of the graph, after the horizontal red line).  The omitted countries are those with shared 
School/National, School/State and Local/National governance arrangements.  I omitted these 
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countries from the OLS analyses because I could not place them into my ordinal arrangement of 
governance frameworks. Additionally, the each country is represented by its abbreviated name. 
A list of the country name abbreviations can be found in Appendix Table 1.1b. 
 
 There is one important note to make about the OLS analyses. A careful look at each 
scatterplot shows that heteroskedasticity has been observed after OLS linear regression models 
were produced for all education system domains. Heteroskedasticity occurs when variance of 
error terms are systematically related to values of the independent variable. Under these 
conditions, the OLS estimate of b (the slope) is unbiased and consistent, but standard errors of 
this estimate are no longer accurate.   As a result, in what follows, I will not discuss statistical 





The results of these analyses are presented in five scatterplots.  Graph 1 shows the results 
for the measure “Produce Education Funds.”  This is the only education system variable with a 
positive slope (B= +.041), indicating a slight tendency for countries with more centralization in 
this system to domain to also be characterized by greater education attainment reproduction.-
However, the slope of this line is so small as to  suggest that a relationship does not exist 
between this governance framework and education attainment reproduction. On the other hand, 
the exclusion of the “School/National” government level category in this OLS linear regression 
brings into question the accuracy of the slopes identified for each indicator because not every 
category is considered. For example, the .04 slope for Produce Education Funds could be due to 
the exclusion of countries with governance framework: Local/National, such as Hungary, Korea, 
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Bulgaria and Finland. If the OLS linear regression included all variables and nations a different 
slope may develop.  
Additionally, the data in Graph 1 shows that the countries examined here differed on 
more than just a mean dimension. Notice in Graph 1 that there is much greater variation in levels 
of education attainment reproduction among nations coded as “National” in framework versus 
nations coded as falling in the other frameworks.  This patterns suggests that with a more 
centralized governance framework in purchasing educational resources, a country is more likely 
to have an extreme level of education attainment reproduction—whether that be extremely more 
unequal or extremely less unequal than other countries.  
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Gaphs 2-4 show the relationships between the other governance framework variables and 
education attainment inequality.  Notice here that the slope is always negative, indicating that as 
countries become more centralized in a system domain, education attainment inequality is less.  
Once again, the size of these slopes is small, suggesting a lack of relationship.  Notice also that 
there is always heteroskedasticity in the data.  In Graph 2, countries with local control over 
purchasing of education resources show more variation in education attainment inequality, 
whereas in the remaining graphs, it is more centralized countries that show more variation.  
Looking across all 5 graphs, the general finding would thus seem to be that while 
centralization/decentralization are not related to mean differences in education attainment 
outcomes, in 4 out of 5 cases, decentralization in a system domain leads to less variation in 
education attainment inequality among countries and centralization in a system domain leads to 
more variation. 
Although these findings on variation in levels of education attainment reproduction 
across different governance frameworks suggest a possible influence of governance frameworks 
on education attainment reproduction, these findings may be misleading. The clear variation that 
can be observed in these education system domains could be due to unequal sample sizes across 
governance framework types. Different observations may develop when a country sample that 
more equally distributes countries into governance framework types is used. For example, if 
more countries with a national governance framework were represented in Purchasing Education 
Resources, a relationship between governance frameworks and variation in levels of education 
attainment reproduction may be less clear.  
Overall, results from the slope and variation of OLS regressions do not provide definitive 
evidence about whether or not an association truly exists between governance frameworks and 
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educational attainment reproduction. Moreover, although all slopes were unbiased, their level of 
accuracy is questionable due to sampling bias, and although variation impacts were suggested in 
the study, strong claims cannot be made because the country sample could be biased towards 
certain types of governance frameworks. Additionally, the historical dysfunction noted in 
footnote 3 could be affecting the slope and variation of my data because it is possible that the 
governance frameworks for certain domains, such as budget and curriculum, have changed since 
my respondents have been in the education system. On the other hand, the presence of unbiased 
slopes for all domains—even Education Jurisdiction and Education Policy, which have (more 
than likely) been unchanged since -respondents went through the education system—leads me to 




To further assess the association between governance frameworks and education 
attainment reproduction, I conducted a series of difference of means T-tests for independent 
samples, under the assumption that variances were unequal across groups. These tests were done 
to assess if statistically significant differences exist in the average mean value for education 
attainment reproduction across governance framework types in different education system 
domains. Unlike the linear regression analysis, all governance framework types are included in 
this test for each domain. However, the original typology for governance framework, which has 
been previously explained, is condensed into three groups for this study, which include: “[1] 
Lower”, “[2] Shared” and “[3] National”.  
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Graphs 5-10 are once again scatterplots with the least squares slope indicated in the 
graph.  However, rather than estimating this slope via OLS regression, I simply conducted a set 
of t-tests for difference in means across groups characterized by different governance 
frameworks.  Table 3 shows the results of these analyses.  After running tests between [1]-[2], 
[2]-[3] and [1]-[3], across all domains, no statistically significant differences in education 
attainment reproduction were found. Moreover, the inability to find any difference in mean 
values of education attainment reproduction across governance framework groups, and across all 
domains, strengthens the argument that governance frameworks are not associated with 
education attainment reproduction. Again, I must bring into question the validity of my findings 
due to the age of my respondents, which could create differences in education systems from 
when they were in school and now. However, similar to before, the same findings were found 











To gain further understanding of the findings just presented, I conducted additional 
analyses (not shown here).  These analyses are warranted by the fact that many case studies have 
reported impacts on education inequality for nations that were actively engaged in decentralizing 
or centralizing their education systems.  These case study findings are on the face inconsistent 
with my findings since they suggest that governance frameworks do influence levels of 
education attainment reproduction in some way. With this in mind, I challenge my findings and 
indulge another possibility: Although a direct association between governance frameworks and 
levels of education attainment reproduction is not suggested in this study, a different association 
may be evident. Perhaps other variables condition the relationship between governance 
frameworks and education attainment reproduction. Leaving such variables out of my analysis 
could be why governance frameworks do not appear to influence education inequality in my 
study but do show effects in case studies. 
To investigate this idea, I set out to investigate interaction effects between education 
attainment reproduction and other measurements of social inequalities. The following social 
inequality indicators: GINI, GDP, Tertiary Entrance Rates and Regional Disparities were 
collected from a database of indicators from University of Michigan Institute for Social 
Research, Population Studies Center, and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD). Please see the Appendix for more information on these indicators. With 
these indicators, regressions were run between education attainment reproduction, each 
education system domain indicator, each new variable, and the interaction of each domain and 
each new indicator (i.e. domain X new indicator).  
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After running these regressions, no statistically significant interaction effects were found. 
Moreover, my new indicators were not correlated with education attainment reproduction. This 
lack of association between the new indicators and my measure of education attainment 
inequality could be due to the historical dysfunction problem I’ve mentioned previously in this 
paper. That is, up until this point, I’ve been performing this research with the assumption that 
governance frameworks are stable enough that my historical disjunction problem does not 
greatly affect my results. However, my new indicators are contemporaneous indicators of social 
and educational inequality, and lack of correlation between these indicators and my dependent 
variable raises questions about this assumption.  Despite this, I still believe interaction effects are 
relevant to the study of governance frameworks and should be pursued in the future.  
Unfortunately, I am unable to examine these interactions further given the limitations of my data. 
As a result, I am unable to comment on this hypothesis further and cannot make confident claims 
about whether or not interaction effects are causing governance frameworks to influence 




This research approached the study of governance frameworks in education systems in a 
new way. By using log-linear models of educational mobility, it examined the direct effects that 
governance frameworks have on levels of education attainment reproduction in national 
education systems. Rather than relying on case studies, this research included as many as 26 
nations. In this research, an association between parental social class and the educational 
outcomes of their children was used to measure levels of inequality, which was detected for all 
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national education systems to some degree. From these measurements, a relationship between 
governance frameworks and education attainment reproduction was studied. Despite past 
literature, this study suggested that governance frameworks in education have little influence on 
education attainment reproduction. However, flaws in the study should temper our interpretation 
of the importance of these findings.  As discussed, there is at least some potential that my results 
have been affected by a historical disjunction in the data, and as a result, I make no concrete 
claims based on the results. In the future, this study could be reconstructed to account for the 
historical disjunction noted by using other measurements of education inequality or by including 
multiple measurements to assess how much historical disjunction is affecting results. However, I 
was unable to do this because of time constraints. 
Although I will not make any strong claims, I do believe this study is relevant and 
valuable. One reason is that two indicators, Education Jurisdiction and Education Policy, have 
not changed in the past century for all education systems that were included in this sample. 
While I found no mean differences in education attainment inequality across nations that had 
different governance frameworks in these domains, the analyses did show a relationship to 
variation in education attainment reproduction across these governance framework types. Thus, 
if we just looked at the results of these domains alone, it would suggest that governance 
frameworks do not impact mean differences in education attainment reproduction but might 
affect variance in this phenomenon. From this study alone, this cannot develop into a strong 
argument. However, this study further widens the possibility that governance frameworks are 






This research set out to measure how strongly governance frameworks influence levels of 
education inequality and to establish a new viewpoint on decentralization. Governmental regime 
shifts in education systems has spawned many academic opinions on the effects of governance 
frameworks on national levels of education inequality. Much of the literature on education tends 
to observe governance frameworks as they relate to standardization. The majority of these 
academic opinions believe decentralization increases education inequalities and centralization 
lessens them. However, this research study opens discussion to another viewpoint. 
This viewpoint, which is worth considering even from the limitations of this research, 
calls into question the certainty that education systems are executing governance frameworks 
because they affect education inequality. Irrespective of historical disjunction, this study shows 
that the majority of education systems have very similar—if not, the same—governance 
frameworks in practically every domain despite having very different levels of education 
attainment reproduction. National education systems have been enduring governmental regime 
changes to improve their education system. It would appear as though these national education 
systems are “loosely coupled” because although they have similar governance frameworks, this 
similarity is irrelevant to their levels of education attainment reproduction (Weick, 1976). 
Education systems are becoming more homogenous in structure (Baker and Letendre, 2005), 
despite how these structures may or may not affect their education system. One way to explain 
this loosely coupled dynamic among national education systems is institutional Isomorphism.  
National education systems may be changing their governmental regimes to adhere to 
institutional forces. National governments and global agencies have been advocating for certain 
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types of governance frameworks for years (Buenfil, 2000) and these forces can cause nations to 
feel compelled to take these suggestions and implement them in their organization (DiMaggio 
and Powell, 1983). Every education system has a government framework, and many nations are 
adopting similar governance frameworks to adhere to forces that prefer certain frameworks 
rather than others. With a desire to establish “legitimacy” in political arenas or in an effort to 
respond to “uncertainty” in how to improve their education system, nations are conforming to 
these global pressures and developing more homogenous education systems (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983).  
What if education systems are not changing their governance frameworks because they 
have found a structure that will lessen education inequality? What if they are not sure what will 
happen after they endure a governmental regime change, and are merely conforming to global 
institutional pressures as best they can for reasons that are irrelevant to education inequality? 
This viewpoint is a worthy perspective to how governance frameworks influence education 
systems. Unfortunately, stronger claims about this cannot be made from the findings in this 
study. However, the structure of this study is still helpful because it looks at governance 
frameworks in a new way.  
Future research discussions should continue to observe governance frameworks with 
more complexity, by observing education systems through particular domains and irrespective of 
standardization structures. Additionally, the possibility of other mechanisms influencing 
governance frameworks in such a way that effects educational attainment reproduction has been 
hypothesized however could not be studied in this research because of historical differences in 
education systems. To remedy the issue of historical dysfunction, using other measurements of 
education inequality would have been a route this study could have taken. Future researchers that 
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wish to take on a similar study can go about it the same way that I have, and just adjust the 
measurement of education inequality so that historical disjunction does not influence their 
findings. 
 As literature continues to delve deeper into the complexities of governance frameworks 
and how they interact with education systems, I believe more viewpoints will arise. If this should 
happen however, we may still find homogenous governance frameworks amongst national 
education system. Education systems, as loosely coupled systems, will more than likely remain 
homogenous and conform to institutional pressures regardless of the outcome. But, if future 
studies validate the findings in this study, we may be able to rest easy. Regardless of how 
education systems construct their governance frameworks, it may have very little impact on 
education attainment reproduction, and maybe even other mechanisms of education inequality. 
This study, even without being able to make claims on the inherent nature of governance 
frameworks, allows the possibility that governance frameworks have no bearing on education 
inequality to be a worthy perspective. However, until strong findings can support this new 
perspective, this study must end with encouraging others to also think…What if governance 
frameworks do not affect education inequality, as greatly as current opinions may believe? 
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Appendix 3 Social Inequality Indicators 
 
 
GINI Indicator. Data for the GINI indicator was collected from a database produced by 
University of Michigan Institute for Social Research, Population Studies Center. This database is 
not open to the public yet however, this study was granted access by the creators. The indicator 
is based on equivalized household disposable income, after taxes and transfers, and the extent to 
which the distribution of income or consumption expenditure among individuals or households 
within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. The original source for data can 
be found in the World Bank Databank. 
 
Tertiary Entrance Rate Indicator. Data for the Tertiary Entrance Rate indicator was collected 
from the OECD Library 2010 Education: Key Tables from OECD database. The indicator is a 
measurement of first time entrance into tertiary education as a percentage of the population in the 
corresponding age group. Tertiary Entrance rates were collected from 2000 to 2007. However, 
this study is based on the 2007 tertiary entrance data.  
 
GDP Indicator. Data for the GDP indicator was collected from a database produced by 
University of Michigan Institute for Social Research, Population Studies Center. This database is 
not open to the public yet however, this study was granted access by the creators. GDP per capita 
is gross domestic product divided by midyear population. Data are represented in US Dollars. 
The indicator is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for 
depletion and degradation of natural resources. The original source for data can be found in the 
World Bank Data catalog.  
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Regional Disparity Indicator. Data for the Regional Disparity indicator was collected from the 
OECD Regional Database that was last updated in March 2012. The database contains 
demographic statistics on regional GDP level of all OECD country regions from 1999 to 2009. 
To develop a regional disparity indicator, I calculated the coefficient of variation in regional 
GDP for each country. 
 
